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Relational Truth-creation: Between Bare Literal
Openness and Mutual Manipulation
Petra Gelhaus
University of Münster
e intention of this article is to highlight some aspects that question a simplis-
tic idea of truth as corresponding to the facts that is oen implied in the impera-
tive “Tell the truth!”: the epistemological status of the biomedical information, the
choice and development of relevant information, and the complicated process of
adjusting two dierent ways of explanations with the actual state of aairs. Telling
the truth is a delicate and complicated process, the more if it is embedded in other
communicational tasks like therapy and diagnosis. It requires a successive devel-
opment of mutual understanding, and it has educative and insofar also possibly
manipulative aspects, that may on the rst view contradict the guiding imperative.
us, truth-telling is not translating a medical checklist to everyday language, but
requires hermeneutic as well as constructive capacities from both, sender and re-
ceiver of the information.
Keywords: truth, correspondence theory of truth, constructivist theory of truth,
patient-physician-relationship, doctor-patient-communication, professional ethics,
informed consent, hermeneutics
“Och oupphörligt blir man på nytt ställd inför Pilati gamla fråga: vad
fan är sanning?”
Hjalmar Söderberg, Den allvarsamma leken, 1912, 93
1. Introduction
One of the most common ethical demands on doctors is “to tell the truth”.
Heart-breaking stories are told from the 1950s and 60s, when “everything is
all right” could either mean that everything was in fact all right, or that it
was so bad that nothing could be done anymore. If a physician told a patient
that he could go home, eat what he liked, do what he liked, had no reason to
worry and no need formedical treatment or advice whatsoever, this could be
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scary information—possibly theworst one could get: e.g. untreatable cancer.
Among doctors it was largely accepted that the physician was in command
of the knowledge around disease, and it was her task to take decisions about
necessary and useful treatments, and about the amount of information she
gave to the patient. Especially very bad prognoses were oen withheld from
the patient.e reason for not telling a patient the truth about a fatal cancer
diagnosis was not to harm the patient, additionally to his disease. e bad
message that necessarily led to fear and psychological pain was seen as an
avoidable harm, and the patient should be protected from it. In the words
of modern principlism: e non-malecence principle was given highest
value in a situation where the doctor could not by medical means alleviate
the patient’s situation.
Since then, a shi of paradigm concerning truthful information of the
patient from paternalism to autonomy has occurred. Already earlier, lat-
est since the Nuremberg Codes from 1948, the necessity of full information
and competent consent to experimentation on human beings has been con-
rmed. Today, a strategy of hiding painful truth from the patient is usually
seen as obsolete and unacceptably paternalistic. It is not regarded as com-
patible with respect for the patient’s autonomy to withhold information that
is necessary for his decisions, even though some attention has been given to
the fact that there is no duty to be autonomous in this understanding.ere
is not only a right to know, but also a right not to know against one’s will, and
the possibility to delegate the choice to others, e.g. to the medical expert.
In medical ethics, great attention has been attributed to the conditions
that make autonomous decisions of the patient concerning his own health
and his own treatment possible (Beauchamp and Childress 2009). A key
element of a competent choice is the right kind of disclosure, i.e. the trans-
fer of the necessary and relevant medical information from the physician to
the patient in order to enable him to make an autonomous choice (Faden
and Beauchamp 1986). e straightest idea of transfer of medical informa-
tion from the doctor to the patient is implied in the informational physician-
patient-relationship (Emanuel andEmanuel 1992).1 According to thismodel,
the doctor is seen exclusively as an expert in scientic medical knowledge
and technical skills. She2 has got no special responsibilities for the patient in
addition to exerting this expertise. She has to transfer that part of her knowl-
edge to the patient that is relevant for his decision-making, and aer getting
1 Emanual and Emanual distinguish four models of the physician-patient-relationship: in-
formative, interpretative, deliberative and paternalistic; with a growing inuence of the
doctor on the decision-making.
2 I am using ‘she’ for the doctor and ‘he’ for the patient, in order to simplify the use of pro-
nouns.
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the order of the patient, she should exert her technical skills at a satisfactory
level of competence.
Physician Patient
Information
Fig. 1. Informational model.
It is an attractive model, as it makes paternalism impossible and guar-
antees that the values of the patient are decisive in the process of disease,
diagnostics and therapy. In addition to this, it frees the doctor from the
burdens of special moral obligations to the patient and his welfare. No spe-
cial capacities to deal with existential states, with irrational fear, with dark
psychological mechanisms, and with despair, are required. Competence in
medical knowledge, technical skills, and openness and truthfulness to the
patient are her only tasks. In the case of an end stage of cancer, there is
no danger of misunderstanding, no ambivalence between dierent moral
principles, and no danger of leaving the patient alone in a necessarily ig-
norant state guided by another person, who has articially augmented the
pre-existing asymmetry of essential information.
A disadvantage of this clear model is that it is far from reality. Identify-
ing the relevant information is not only a matter of translating the medical
language of the available scientic knowledge in everyday language. Start-
ing from the point of “information”, inspired from cybernetics3 and infor-
mation technology, the model excludes the delicate question of what is the
truth that has to be transmitted: this has to be clear in advance. e ques-
tion of truth is one of the oldest topics in philosophy; it has been widely
discussed and is controversial. It surpasses the scope of this article to sketch
the whole variety of positions, but some orientation might be useful. e
classical denitions regard truth as a relational notion between the human
mind and reality (Aquinas 1265–1274, I, q 21). Aristotle emphasized that the
things come rst, and the truthful description is primarily dependant on the
3 “Cybernetics: Science of regulation and control in animals (including humans), organi-
zations, and machines when they are viewed as self-governing whole entities consisting
of parts and their organization. It was conceived by Norbert Wiener, who coined the
term in 1948. Cybernetics views communication and control in all self-contained com-
plex systems as analogous. It diers from the empirical sciences (physics, biology, etc.)
in not being interested in material form but in organization, pattern, and communica-
tion in entities. Because of the increasing sophistication of computers and the eorts to
make them behave in humanlike ways, cybernetics today is closely allied with articial
intelligence and robotics, and it draws heavily on ideas developed in information theory.”
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cybernetics, accessed 21/11/2012.
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things how they are (Aristotle 2009). e position that truth means corre-
spondence with facts and reality is close to everyday understanding. On the
other hand, with regard to fallibility of human perception and knowledge,
it is doubtful how one ever could know for sure that one’s convictions cor-
respond to the “real facts”. Actually, it is a hypothesis that there exist things
that own a concrete essence independently of one’s mind. Many theories
have therefore focussed on truth criteria, i.e. the rules that must be followed
for a statement to be dened as truthful. Logical truths are of this kind, but
also coherence and consensus can serve this purpose. In postmodernism
and radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld 1996) the existence of one truth
is denied, and there is no objective standpoint from which competing con-
structions of reality can be judged.
In this article, there will be no comparison of theories and their argu-
ments.e discussed question is a practical ethical one: How can and should
a physician tell the truth to his patients, as required for Informed Consent
and autonomous decision-making?e practical question implies, however,
all the problems the theories of truth address. Hence, in the following, I in-
tend to show that the doctor has to nd, together with the patient, a position
between a plain correspondence theory and a constructivist theory of truth.
e practical question may seem not very inventive. Much attention
has been given by Beauchamp and Childress (2009), Faden and Beauchamp
(1986) and Wear (1993) to how to weigh and balance principles and how to
translate and adjust information to the patient’s understanding. Physician-
patient-communication is also subject of abundant empirical research. e
focus of this article, however, is the theoretical question about the nature
of that “truth” that is morally required in a disclosure. As I try to show is
the above mentioned model of information misleading. It tends to imply a
simpler distribution of necessary knowledge than there really is, and thus is
tends to distribute the roles and the duties in an unrealistic way. A better
and more complex understanding of the truth and the type and construc-
tion of the information it contains can result in a practical application of
the moral demands that makes a dierence, though the moral basis remains
untouched.
I am using a combination of analytical and dialectical methods, there-
fore I give no stipulative denitions and derive their consequences, but I
analyse and discuss dierent models with their strengths and weaknesses,
developing step by step a synthesis of them as a result, not as a starting point
of my reasoning. First I analyse shortcomings of a too simplistic everyday
understanding of “telling the truth” and focus on the necessary interpretive
and relational aspects of truth-telling (2.-4.). en I address shortly the in-
applicability of pure relational constructivism which is in clear opposition
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to the very idea of modern medicine (5.). In the conclusion (6.), a synthesis
of essential elements of both positions in form of relational truth creation in
accordance with the available and relevant facts is supported.
2. Scientic evidence or what is “the truth” that has to been told?
Several levels of reality interfere with the elegant simplicity of the model in
g.1. e most basic one is implicit in medical epistemology, or more pre-
cisely, in general scientic epistemology. All available knowledge is not a
direct possession of the facts themselves (Popper 1934). Science does not
own reality and facts, but organizes experiences and tests these hypothe-
ses in a systematic way. ere is no endpoint included, and the everyday
pretension “Science has proven that A is true”, or “that A is the case” is an
unscientic trivialisation. “Science at its current stage regards A as the best
interpretation of all available evidence, and publishing these results invites
to critical discussion”, would be a more exact expression, in a scientic per-
spective.4 Unfortunately, if one uses this description, the probable eect on
a non-scientist will be the wrong impression that one doubts one’s own pre-
tensions, and that the state of aairs is a matter of mere belief or opinion.
at is not the case. e knowledge is the best available knowledge, and
only a better scientic model that explains as many or even more of all data
would be a valid opponent. Doubting one’s own theories is an inevitable as-
pect of all scientic knowledge, in clear contrast to all ideological certainty
about how the world is. at is why science was able to discover and inte-
grate so many facts and to give the best valid explanations for them today.
ere will be better explanations in future. Positivists believe (unscienti-
cally) that all knowledge—a congruence of knowledge with all facts—is in
principle available and once will be reached.5
us, an oen neglected problem a doctor has whowants to tell a patient
the scientic truth is to nd out his stance on scientic knowledge. Does he
naively take the available knowledge for the facts themselves? Does he, on
the other hand, naively think some unproven belief systems are on the same
level of evidence as the gathered available scientic knowledge? Howwill he
understand the data she has to hand over to him? One expert opinion among
4 A good introduction to philosophy of science isWhat Isising Called Science? (1982).
5 “Positivism: a theory that theology andmetaphysics are earlier imperfect modes of knowl-
edge and that positive knowledge is based on natural phenomena and their properties
and relations as veried by the empirical sciences”. “Logical positivism: a 20th century
philosophical movement that holds characteristically that all meaningful statements are
either analytic or conclusively veriable or at least conrmable by observation and ex-
periment and that metaphysical theories are therefore strictly meaningless”. http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/positivism, accessed 21/11/2012.
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many others, and a matter of taste who is right? A godlike and unquestion-
able truth and she is the priest to reveal the fate? Both would not correspond
to the real status of the truth she has to and can reveal. In addition, sitting at
the doctor’s reception, waiting anxiously for some decisive results that may
be crucial for the patient’s future, is hardly the right situation to get a concise
course in epistemology. It is the wrong time for that, and I doubt one could
nd a single patient who would be open for that. If he is no epistemologist
himself, however, there is a big chance that he will have the distorted idea
of science that is usually spread in the media. So how does the doctor make
sure that the patient receives her message in the right mode of certainty?
A second level of uncertainty adds to this general epistemological lim-
itation: Nearly all available medical knowledge, apart from some banal ex-
ceptions,6 is of statistical nature. In medicine, we move in a continuum of
uncertainty. Evidence based medicine and biostatistics contribute to know-
ing more exactly how uncertain our knowledge is. Usually, a medication or
a therapy help, say 60% of the patients (under controlled trial conditions)
compared to 40% in the placebo group, while 20% develop headaches and
sickness, (compared to 10% in the control group), and less than 1 in ten thou-
sand will die of a specic life-threatening adverse eect. All this the doctor
knows with a certain probability of error according to the design of the re-
spective studies, plus an unknown probability of conicts of interest that
may have inuenced the interpretations of the results. is is concrete and
valuable knowledge as a basis of concrete practical decisions to be made. It
requires training and experience to be able to take the necessary decisions on
this basis. It is impossible to know for sure in advance if the special patient
in front of her will prot, suer or even die as a consequence of the decision
that has to been made. is applies not to a few or selected decisions in the
course of a treatment but is the general rule. Surely the patient should be
informed about risks and chances of a treatment, but what does it mean to
tell him the truth in this context? Informing him fully would mean to send
him through encompassing medical and biostatistical studies with regard to
his and related diseases and dierential diagnoses. at is unrealistic and
cannot be the point of telling a patient the truth and let the autonomous de-
cisionwith him. Perhaps evenmore signicant: it is not what patients expect
of doctors: to be teachers in medical knowledge so that the patients are able
to decide all aspects of their treatment. Evenmedical doctors—even special-
ists in the respective discipline—are strongly advised not to treat themselves
or close relatives, because a reasonable balance of the risks at hand is hardly
to do in an emotionally overly demanding situation: in pain, in fear for one’s
6 E.g. that all men will die, and will die without oxygen, water, food etc. Even that they will
die if they fall without parachute from 3000 m height is not true without exceptions.
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life or for one’s nearest. It seems an inappropriate goal to put the patient in
the situation of a biomedical specialist who is aected himself, and expect
that he should take thewhole burden of uncertainty in the pending decisions
on his own.
Telling the truth in this context must mean to inform the patient about
the good chances to get help from this medication, and inform him about
the more probable and the more dangerous adverse eects that could hap-
pen. In the course of treatment, it is the physician’s responsibility to ask
actively about the more common side eects and to control laboratory re-
sults in order to minimize severe dangers. It is part of a physician’s expertise
and responsibility to control the uncertainty implicit in medical knowledge
as good as possible. Having informed the patient is not enough.
3. Doctor-patient-communication (1) orwhat is “relevant truth”?
A second pitfall in the seemingly simple demand to inform the patient ade-
quately is hidden in the limitation of telling only the “relevant” information.
It is obvious that the patient cannot be told about all medical known facts.
at is not feasible, not wished and not necessary for an autonomous deci-
sion. All details that do not inuence the patient’s decision and his under-
standing of his situation are negligible. But how should the doctor know in
advance what will be important for the patient, in order to decide? Given
the same medical situation, this is individually very dierent. Many pa-
tients, confronted with a choice between dierent examinations, treatments
or non-treatments will prefer not to be bothered with too many details and
improbable outcomes, but get a pre-selected choice, with an understandable
interpretation of options that could be comparably reasonable candidates of
choice. Others wantmuch broader information, value certain aspects dier-
ently than average people, or want also to get presented alternatives that are
not supported by medical evidence (e.g. new and experimental or so-called
alternative therapies).
Giving the relevant information therefore implies not only having the
necessary knowledge and reproducing it. It also means choosing among it
with regard to the needs of the patient. In order to be able to do that, the
doctor has to know the patient, his general mental structure, his values and
preferences pretty well. In fact, even if she has met him many times before,
she cannot know how he will react facing this special and new situation—or
if hemight have changed hismind in relevantways since shemet him the last
time. e only (and only seemingly trivial) thing she can do is to talk with
the patient, to ask him about his life, his values, his preferences, his world
view, his family situation, his work and hobbies and so on. Giving relevant
information requires that she has at least an idea what could be relevant for
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the patient and his decision. Practically, this cannot be a unidirectional pro-
cess. It has to be an interaction, and the relevancy of the available medical
knowledge can only be developed in this mutual information process be-
tween doctor and patient. At rst view, this might appear only as a small
and nice, humane addition to the obligation to inform truthfully, such as:
“be also kind, polite and communicate decently with the patient”. Actually,
it is an essential part of detecting the relevant information at all. e infor-
mation I ought to give is unknown to me, if I am not detecting it together
with the patient.
Perhaps this is what is meant by the ideal of “shared decision-making”,
in the deliberativemodel of the physician-patient relationship (Emanuel and
Emanuel 1992) but it is useful to be a bit clearer and more detailed in what
should be shared, or perhaps better: exchanged.7 It is not the psychologi-
cal part of decision-making which is very dierent for doctor and patient.
Establishing a good contact is essential for just doing the basic task: detect-
ing the relevant information and giving it to the patient in order to enable
him to make his decisions. e ow of information comes from both sides,
but the kind of information, the demands on both protagonists with regard
to empathy and receptiveness are dierent. e patient is the expert on the
values, settings andmeanings of his own life that might be threatened by his
illness—and by available therapies.e physician is the expert with regard to
available medical knowledge andmedical interventions. Together they have
to develop those parts of knowledge that are meaningful for the patient, and
those options that require decisions. In order to do this successfully, it is
more trust that is required from the patient, and more empathy from the
physician.8 On the other hand, the patient needs more receptivity of tech-
nical and epistemological facts, and the doctor more didactic capacities of
explaining them to someone in a dicult situation. at is, both of them
need to be open for those meaningful elements of knowledge the other one
is expert in, and both need to try to facilitate the exchange of them. Both
have the common but dicult task to nd a common language level, in or-
der to understand each other correctly and give that part of the huge amount
7 Actually, two of the four models imply dierent types of shared decision-making: the in-
terpretive and the deliberative model. e inuence as well as the responsibility of the
physician is bigger in the deliberative model. In the deliberative model the doctor helps
the patient not only to decide, but also to develop his values. ough this is the model
favoured by Emanual and Emanual, it goes a step farther than supported in this article. I
try to show howmuch relational interaction is already needed for the interpretativemodel,
and in order to emphasize this, I prefer to call it a hermeneutic model. It is, however, very
close to the interpretive model.
8 For a more detailed elaboration of the role of empathy for professional medical ethics see
(Gelhaus 2012).
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of details to the other in a way that contributes to mutual understanding of
the state of aairs. A tentative illustrative model would be a spiral-like pro-
cess of developing in a dialectic hermeneutic process that thing that could
be called “relevant truth”.
Patient Physician
Information
Information
Fig. 2. Hermeneutic Model of “Relational Truth Creation”.
It is noteworthy to stress that this is not only a more complicated way
of the linear transfer of information but a process of construction instead of
mere transmission.
4. Doctor-patient-communication (2) or what means “telling”?
However, there are simple cases. Some information is simply relevant for all
people as in our above mentioned example of incurable cancer. Here such a
dicult process to select the relevant aspects of medication is certainly not
required. So the modern variant of the story told in the introduction could
look like this:
Hurrying through his daily round, the ward physician enters a room
with three patients, greeting shortly and informing the patient in the second
bed: “By the way, according to the pathology results your tumour is a can-
cer and it is beyond curative treatment. You can leave the hospital today.”
Aer having dealt with the other two patients, informing them about their
diagnostic results, she leaves the room.
is story can occur this way, but it is of course not according to the state
of the art. Medical students are taught the ways of “breaking bad news”, in
many medical schools this is trained with role plays and with practical ad-
vices as to choose the right setting (not with other persons in the room), to
have enough time for this talk, to have, in fact, repeated times to talk with
the patient about it, because it is dicult to accept this message. One oen
emphasized aspect is to leave hope to the patient—not illusionary hope for
a miracle, but for on-going support and palliation. So the vignette is not
presenting the modern ideal. But within the scope of this article the inter-
esting question is: Why is this not the ideal way of “telling the truth”? It
is obvious that this truth is relevant, and this needs no empathy with the
specic patient. It also seems to be a situation where no medical decisions
are at hand. Later, there may come up further questions of dierent pal-
liative options that require more dierentiated information of the patient,
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but with regard to the present state of medical knowledge the relevant as-
pects are obvious enough and do not require long interactions. e uttered
information is indeed the relevant one, and it is given in a clear, understand-
able and unequivocal way, without using much medical jargon. As there are
no medical means to inuence this information, there are no further expla-
nations required. However, the daily life and the future of the patient are
deeply addressed, and so the patient needs this information for all kinds of
autonomous non-medical choices. Why is it still wrong to tell the truth this
way?
One answer is that “uttering in an understandable way” is not what is
meant by “telling”. “Telling” something to someone means that the sender
of information is aware of the receiver. Secondly, it means that the sender
is aware of dierent modes of transferring the information, and is choosing
one of them that is best suitable to address the receiver in an intended way.
If it would be the case that the intention was only to give the information to
the patient, the method chosen in our example would not be wrong. Actu-
ally, that is not the point of the ethical demand to tell the truth. e point
is to enable the patient to make autonomous decisions. If the doctor only
fulls the part of giving the information and leaves the rest to the patient
she is not telling the truth, because she does not care about the receiver and
the reception, and she does not facilitate to receive it in the right mode of
understanding.
If you tell a criminal story, it is not sucient to sketch the content. In
fact, it would be wrong to do so at rst hand. You have to build up tension,
wrong tracks, and alternatives. You have to keep the interest of your listener
awake, and you are allowed to use all kinds of means for that. Revealing the
information what happens in the story and why is counter-productive—it
should only get clear in the end, and it should be surprising, neither ad hoc
nor foreseeable. (Masters of the art can play with these demands, and start
with the solution, proving their mastery in keeping up the tension in spite
of that). Similarly, the disclosure of medical facts to the patient is not only
a matter of information to pass. e ethical goal of telling the truth to the
patient implies to give the information in a way that enables the patient to
take it, to work with it, and to use it in a way that is compatible with his
autonomy.9 Telling it while other people are listening does not only violate
9 Of course these insights are not very inventive. All important authors who have worked
about Informed Consent spend much eort on showing failures to avoid (as e.g. compul-
sion) and on the measures necessary to translate the relevant medical knowledge into a
language that is understandable for the individual patient. (e.g. Faden and Beauchamp
1986, Wear 1993) What I intend to show is that a too simple idea of information the physi-
cian has to give is inconsistent, and that, on the one hand, many seemingly additional
points to consider (like creating a good contact with the patient) are necessary elements
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condentiality but also demonstrates lacking respect and lacking empathy.
A normal reaction to such a bad message could be shock, unbelief, anger,
panic, grief and so on. Nobody would like to have strangers as witnesses
of one’s immediate reaction. It is an extreme example of intrusion in one’s
privacy. e patient is urged strongly not to react normally, but to pretend
the message would not provoke strong fears and emotions as it would be
appropriate.
Giving the information without giving the patient the opportunity to re-
act, andwithout the time to see and to answer to the reaction,means that one
is trying to give the informationwithout its full meaning. It is not the “truth”,
i.e., the content that is given, but (however understandably formulated) as
an abstract code, and the painful decipherment is le to the patient alone.
“Telling” the truth wouldmean to help the patient to grasp also themeaning
of the message, with its painful and existential impact.is would, however,
imply that the doctor, though not coming into the same kind of endangered
situation as the patient, would be open for painful and existential experi-
ences, that she could understand them to a certain degree and could stand
to be with persons who are exposed to them.e mode of giving painful or
frightening information requires that one also addresses these dimensions.
All things considered, there are dierent implications in the seemingly
clear and simple imperative “Tell the truth” to the patient: the epistemolog-
ical and statistical status of medical knowledge and the many dimensions of
meaning that the information contains for the patient. None of them can ad-
equately be given unidirectional to the patient, but they have to be developed
together in a rich, complex, and multidimensional communication. is
communication, at the same time, fulls additional necessary tasks, using
and establishing a relationship between patient and doctor, informing the
doctor about essential facts (anamnesis), justifying trust and enabling the
doctor to give condence and comfort. Hence, the borderlines of informed
consent, diagnostics and therapy are open and the same communication can
and ought to serve all these dierent goals at the same time. It is a merit of
philosophy to distinguish the dierent aspects that have to be considered.
e analysis and distinction make it easier to clarify the goals and means
and their hierarchy and to point to fatal misunderstandings about what is in
the patient’s best interest. It is the task of prudential practice, however, “to
putHumpty-Dumpty together again” (Cassell 1991) and not to work only ac-
cording to a checklist of necessary elements. Signing an informed consent
sheet is not necessarily expression of autonomy, and uttering medical facts,
of the very core of disclosure, while some warnings of things to avoid (like manipulation)
can be exaggerated or at least have to be discussed sophisticatedly in context of a certain
situation.
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even in a translation to everyday language, is oen no sucient disclosure.
5. Manipulation and truth creation
If the relevant information is oen not something at hand but something
that has to be elaborated by doctor and patient together, how farmay each of
them go in shaping the truth? According to constructivism and postmodern
ideas, both have their own truths, constructed by their unique life history
and socialisation in their respective (or common) culture. e doctor has
been socialized inmedical education and has ideas on the state of the patient
that are probably shaped by science and medicine, the patient has his own
ideas. No perspective is superior, and there is no independent observing
standpoint from which an adequacy could be judged. Is then the process of
creating a common level of truth a negotiation between both truths, amutual
manipulation until equilibrium is reached? How could one prevent that one
that is more eloquent convinces the other totally of his position? If one is
more stubborn, and one less condent, can this inuence the truth? Would
it be possible that both come to the conviction that the cancer diagnosis is
irrelevant and indulge in the folie-á-deux that the patient is perfectly healthy,
and could that still be called truth? at does not only seem absurd from a
common sense point of view. It is also an inconsistent description of the
situation. Usually, the patient comes to the doctor because he has at least
some conviction that the doctor can do something in order to help him, and
he has some ideas about modern medicine and its scientic foundation. So
both patient and doctor are on a common ground and accept the existence
of a reality that can at least partly be detected and inuenced by medicine.
Creating a “truth” that contradicts the facts could not be called a truth in
a medical setting. Insofar a certain form of correspondence theory of truth
is unavoidable if one does not deconstruct the whole situation of patient
and physician. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand how one can reach a
common level of truth without being exible—on both sides—in the under-
standing, interpretation, and explanation of the facts. us, one has to give
up at least temporarily one’s own relation to the facts—i.e. one’s truth. e
facts are not inuenced, the truth, as the relation of one’s mind to the facts,
is. If the doctor tries to nd out the patient’s convictions about the disease,
she cannot do so if she insists on her own view on it. She should not be scep-
tical, ironic or show a conviction that her own view is superior and closer
to the facts. If she wants to understand the patient’s ideas, she has to take
them seriously, even if they oppose her own ideas.is should better not be
a jovial reserve of someone who knows better. e doctor is on the track of
necessary information, oen as important as some laboratory or x-ray re-
sults. At the same time, this information from the patient is the necessary
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basis for explaining the information the doctor wants to give. Hence, for an
explanation, the convictions of both protagonists in relation to given facts
have to be adjusted to each other. So, in a relational process, a common truth
compatible with the known facts is constructed.
May one then even betray one’s own understanding of truth, lie, in other
words, in the service of a relational truth creation? Partly, this is a question
of nding a common language and understanding each other’s metaphors
correctly. If both of them, doctor and patient, communicate about a heart
failure, e.g., this may imply dierent things—and it is not always the doctor
who has the more mechanistic idea about a dysfunctional pump that has to
be repaired.e heart is also an organ necessary for life, it is a metaphor for
themost important part of a whole, it is related to love and emotions, it is ad-
dressed by so-called stress hormones and it is together with kidneys and pi-
tuitary gland involved in the complex regulation systemofwater, electrolytes
and blood pressure. e task to talk about the same thing is not trivial, the
more as one is not necessarily aware of all connotations one bears in mind
(Gelhaus 2009). If the doctor tries to explain the results of dierent diagnos-
tic procedures, she has to nd out the pre-understanding of the patient, and
she has to explain what in his organism is wrong, and the consequences of
this. e mechanistic allegory of a defect pump might be useful to explain
and demystify, it may be close to or very far from the patient’s ideas, it might
be a comfort or a disrespectful banalisation for the patient. In a therapeutic
intention, the doctor might want to explain the situation in a way that moti-
vates the patient to take his disease seriously enough to take his medication
and (perhaps more dicult) change his lifestyle, take daily promenades and
stop smoking. On the other hand, she does not intend to frighten the patient
too much, to make him fatalistic or even depressive. e choice of words,
the tune, and the importance that is laid to the information are not innocent.
ey bear a therapeutic and educative as well as a destructive potential, and
also a potential of a missed chance, of course.
At one end of the scale there is the bare information, and one could un-
derstand the pitfalls of communication as a disturbance that has to be over-
come as good as possible. At the other end there is a paternalistic conviction
to know for sure what is best for the patient, and to use all means to bring
him there, even if that means hiding the truth (not informing him about
a conservative treatment option as an alternative to an operation, e.g.) or
actually lying, i.e. making him believe something that is not the case. Both
extremes seem to bewrong. Both do not take the goals of the doctor-patient-
communication seriously enough. e rst one overemphasizes a misun-
derstood idea of patient’s autonomy, the other one a misunderstood idea
of the doctor’s role and the welfare of the patient. But between the wrong
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extremes—where is the right middle? How much adjustment of the facts
to suitable explanations, according to the pre-understanding of the other is
needed, or legitimate? May I even tell a literal lie,10 in order to create an un-
derstanding in the other that is appropriate to the facts? How much may I
inuence the other, and how much should I do that?
ere is no easy answer to this question, but the emphasis of modern
medical ethics on patient’s rights and autonomy, if understood in a complex
way and with consideration of the realistic situation of a patient, gives an
orientation. e aim of all communication directed on disclosure is to en-
able the patient to understand his situation.e task of healthcare is to help
the patient in his health problems, but usually not against his will.11 ough
the doctor might think she knows better what the right decision is, she must
not trick the patient into this solution. She may use strong means to con-
vince him, but the alternatives and their consequences should be clear for
the patient.
e question of choosing explanations and metaphors together with the
patient in order to create a common level of understanding of the relevant
facts is a separate question. Here it may be legitimate and sometimes even
necessary to pretend things that do not really match one’s own understand-
ing, for reasons of under-complexity or as a correction of exaggerated or
clearly wrong ideas. As an extreme, a “white lie” in this regard might be
acceptable.12
E.g.: Patient: “Are you really sure this is the best for me?”
Doctor: “Yes!” instead of “No, it is only a statistically founded
judgment according to the current state of knowledge. I cannot
know, I only hope it is the best for you.”
In this example, there is a subtext hidden behind the literal question. e
patient asks if the doctor has conscientiously chosen a good therapy (the
best one), and at the same time he asks for reassurance, and perhaps also for
comfort. If the doctor does not answer with explaining more clearly which
10 As a “literal lie” I understand a lie where the explicit words express something that is ac-
tually wrong according to the convictions of the speaker.us, it is meant as the opposite
to “literal truth”, when all words are in congruence with the facts, though the message may
be—intentionally or unintentionally—distorted. A “literal lie” is not a blank “lie” if it is not
used with the intention to fool the listener, but with the intention to bring him to a more
adequate understanding of the situation. erefore, a “literal lie” can be used to create a
“relational truth”.
11 Exceptions are if the patient is not able to understand his situation and/or his disease, as it
occurs with some psychiatric diseases, or in early childhood.
12 A “white lie” is a lie that is told with a socially supporting intention (e.g. politeness: “Your
new dress looks wonderful”, even if the speaker thinks it does not suit you).
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kind of knowledge she can provide, but with a conrmation that contradicts
her own knowledge, i.e. her own relation to the facts, then she answers to the
needs of the patient.e intention is however not to mislead the patient, or
to hide or distort the facts.e menace of the disease moves the patient and
inuences his understanding of the situation, and the comfort of the doctor
might work against this. e intention is that the scared and help-seeking
patient understands that the therapy is the best option to oer from the per-
spective of a scientically educated physician without frightening him even
more. Choosing the second suggested answer might be literally more ade-
quate, but lead the patient farther away from the facts. Disappointed about
lacking emotional support, hemight look for help from an alternative healer
who oers more safety and more skill in creating a common level of under-
standing, but less tested explanations and less closeness to the available facts.
e art of giving a good disclosure is to nd out how to explain the facts to
the patient in a way that enables him tomake his decisions, in a state of su-
cient understanding of the facts.e ideal is to nd/create a common expla-
nation that both doctor and patient could full-heartedly accept. ough it
could open the door for wrong, paternalistic manipulation, sometimes even
literal lies may be unavoidable on this way.13
6. Conclusion: Between a correspondence and a constructivist
theory of truth
e intention of this article is to highlight some aspects that question a sim-
plistic idea of truth as corresponding to the facts that is oen implied in
the imperative “Tell the truth!” Telling the truth is a delicate and compli-
cated process, the more if it is embedded in other communicational tasks
like therapy and diagnosis. It requires a successive development of mutual
understanding, and it has educative and insofar also possibly manipulative
aspects.us it requires hermeneutic as well as constructive capacities from
both, sender and receiver of the information. Barely telling the literal truth
can even be counterproductive in this process of creating an adequate un-
derstanding of the situation. Nevertheless, the truth to be reached is not a
mere matter of mutual construction irrespective of facts. ere is a real sit-
uation that has to be understood. Telling the truth means making possible a
level of understanding that corresponds to this situation.is implies both,
a relational construction of explanations, as well as correspondence to facts.
13 Persons with autism-spectrum are known to have big problems with these kinds of white
lies, probably because they have diculties to put themselves empathically in the shoes
of others and understand their emotional subtexts. Oen, their comments are misunder-
stood as rudeness, instead of literal honesty (Jaarsma et al. 2012). A too ’honest’ doctor
runs the same risk.
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Neither of it is sucient alone.
I am emphasizing this point because of practical importance: If un-
derstood so cleanly and simple, a linear informational idea of truth either
can lead physicians to disregarding the outspoken ethical demand of truth-
telling (valuing the patient’s wellbeing higher than his autonomy) or to obey-
ing the rule but not its meaning (literal truth-telling, even if that means ig-
noring the wellbeing and the more complexly understood autonomy). If we
want to be precise with our rules and their practical relevance, we need the
idea of a relational creation of truth which requires activity, attention and
empathy from both physician and patient. It serves the aim of truth-telling,
though itmay include some amount ofmutualmanipulation and even some-
times the pretension of things that may contradict one’s own conviction of
truth (literal lies).is is a dangerous method and should be used with cau-
tion and reluctance, and not with the intention to trick the patient into a
situation or to make the life of the physician easier: its only justication is
to enable the patient to make autonomous decisions, not to override them.
To be absolutely clear: by questioning the literal simplicity of truth-
telling I do not question the right of the patient to have the last word in the
pending decisions—it is his life, and his values should be decisive. We ought
not to dismiss or to go below a standard of “Informed consent”. But having
this ideal of medical ethics in mind, we have to realize the basically interac-
tive nature of this delicatemixture of contents that has to be transmitted.e
demands on a physician are denitely dierent from those on a salesman
who informs about his oered products, and also from those on a science
teacher or on a science reporter. ey require an equally active and ma-
nipulative part in the interaction, but the goals and the adequate means are
dierent. e goals of the physician-patient-communication are the goals
of medicine: the well-being of the patient. Medical ethics has rightly em-
phasized the dangers of paternalism, and reminded the medical profession
forcefully that since Enlightenment it is hard to see how well-being could
be understood without respect for a person’s autonomy. It would be fatal,
however, to understand this warning as a sign to leave the traditional goals
of medicine behind, to focus on a literal understanding of medical informa-
tion, and rely for practical regards on a rationalistic, informational ideal of
the patient’s autonomy alone.
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